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INTRODUCTION

Ogden Commons is a case study of a mixed-use project in North
Lawndale, Chicago, which because of the involvement of a committed
Housing Authority and anchor institutions as well as other regulatory
requirements, represents the intended use of the Opportunity Zone
(OZ) tax incentive. Congress introduced this place-based tax
incentive in the Tax Cut Jobs Act of 2017,1 incorporating the
Investing in Opportunity Act that Senator Cory Booker introduced
with Senator Tim Scott in 2016.2 The idea was to “create[] a powerful
new tool for promoting lasting economic development in the places
that need it most” and to “incentivize private investors to invest their
inactive capital in high-impact projects in economically distressed
communities.”3
Specifically, the OZ tax incentive provides for favorable tax
treatment of capital gains that are reinvested into qualified
opportunity funds (QOFs),4 certain corporations or partnerships that
then invest in Qualified Opportunity Zone property.5 Opportunity
Zone property can be Qualified Opportunity Zone stock, Qualified
Opportunity Zone business property, or a Qualified Opportunity
Zone partnership interest.6 Qualified Opportunity Zones were
designated in each state by the Treasury Department after being
nominated by the states’ respective governors.7 The governors were
limited to selecting a maximum of 25% of the number of low-income
communities, generally tracts with poverty rates of at least 20% or
median family income less than 80% of the area median, within their
state.8

1. See Amendment of 1986 Code, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13823, 131 Stat. 2054,
2183 (2017).
2. See Investing in Opportunity Act, S. 2868, 114th Cong. (2016).
3. The Promise of Opportunity Zones: Hearing on S. 2868 Before the J. Econ.
Comm., 115th Cong. 35 (2018) (statement of Sen. Cory A. Booker) [hereinafter
Booker testimony].
4. See generally I.R.C. § 1400Z-2. Specifically, a taxpayer who realizes a gain
from a sale of property and reinvests that gain in a QOF within a designated
timeframe may defer recognition of the gain. See id. §§ 1400Z-2(a)(1), (b)(1).
Furthermore, if a taxpayer holds the QOF investment for at least ten years, the
taxpayer may increase the basis to the fair market value at the date of sale. See id. §
1400Z-2(c).
5. See id. § 1400Z-2(d)(1). Specifically, the fund must hold at least 90% of its
assets in such property. See id. § 1400Z-2(f).
6. See id. § 1400Z-2(d)(2)(A).
7. See id. § 1400Z-1(b)(1)(A).
8. See id. §§ 1400Z-1(c)(1), 45D(e)(1). Low-income communities are defined
using poverty rates and median family income, as per the New Markets Tax Credit
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There are currently 8,764 designated Opportunity Zones
throughout the United States and its territories,9 comprising
approximately 12% of all U.S. census tracts.10 The number of
designated Opportunity Zones ranges from 14 in the Virgin Islands to
879 in California.11 “One in four Opportunity Zones have a poverty
rate over 40 percent, compared to” 6.7% census tracts nationwide.12
Furthermore, the median family income in an Opportunity Zone is
37% below the state median.13 Part I of this Article describes one
such designated Opportunity Zone in North Lawndale, Chicago,
census tract 8433.14
With a poverty rate of 46%15 and an
unemployment rate of 15%,16 this census tract represents the type of
economically distressed community that Congress intended to assist
with the OZ tax incentive.
To learn more about this community and the Ogden Commons
project, a list of participants to interview was developed from
reviewing press reports regarding the Ogden Commons project as
program. See The Promise of Opportunity Zones, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM.
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2018/11/thepromise-of-opportunity-zones#_edn1 [https://perma.cc/Q8BL-3LZS].
9. See IRS Notice 2018-48, 2018-28 I.R.B. 9 (July 9, 2018).
10. See Patrick Kennedy & Harrison Wheeler, Neighborhood-Level Investment
from the U.S. Opportunity Zone Program: Early Evidence (U.S. Cong. Joint Comm.
on
Tax’n,
Working
Paper,
2021),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
57a3c0fcd482e9189b09e101/t/607893b915858d7bd0d198ba/1618514881004/oz_kenned
y_wheeler.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NBM-8BZ9]. “Census tracts are small spatial units
of approximately 4,000 residents . . . .” Id. at 5. There are 73,057 census tracts in the
United
States.
See
Tallies,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/time-series/geo/tallies.html
[https://perma.cc/R3CC-65QL] (last visited Sept. 19, 2021).
11. See generally Opportunity Zones by Location, OPPORTUNITY ZONES
DATABASE, https://opportunitydb.com/location/ [https://perma.cc/2LMD-AESR]
(last visited Aug. 5, 2021).
12. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE WHITE HOUSE
OPPORTUNITY
AND
REVITALIZATION
COUNCIL
4
(2019),
https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/Main/documents/WHORC-Implementation-Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9L3Q-S8MB].
13. See id.
14. Census Tract 8433, Chicago, Illinois, OPPORTUNITY ZONES DATABASE,
https://opportunitydb.com/zones/17031843300/ [https://perma.cc/9SPQ-29AT] (last
visited Aug. 23, 2021).
15. See Survey on Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months by Sex by Age, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B17001%
29&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B17001&hidePreview=false
(last visited Aug. 5, 2021) (noting the poverty rate is 45.90% for 2017).
16. See American Community Survey on Employment Status, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU
(2017),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=employment&g=
1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSST5Y2017.S2301&hidePreview=true (noting the
unemployment rate is 15% for 2017).
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well as reaching out to the Author’s network of affordable housing
contacts. In-depth telephone interviews with the participants were
held from June 2020 through June 2021, with follow-up questions sent
by email. The interview list was expanded using a snowball sampling
method, where at the end of each interview, each interviewee was
asked for introductions to other participants in the Ogden Commons
project and recommendations of other experts.17 Interviewees
included developers, project sponsors, lawyers, investors, nonprofit
agencies, community development institutions, city and state level
officials’ staff, and employees of the community’s anchor institutions.
There are very few restrictions on the OZ tax incentive except for
the prohibition of investment in certain “sin” businesses such as
racetracks or liquor stores.18 Investors can contribute funds of any
amount and can pool their funds with multiple other investors.19 The
OZ tax incentive was designed to be flexible, but this lack of
regulation is extraordinary. Typically, “federal programs targeting
resources to disinvested communities have incorporated measures
intended to ensure that residents have a voice in how resources are
employed in their community.”20 For example, as explained in Part
II, the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program21 requires the

17. See Sven Berg, Snowball Sampling, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STATISTICAL
SCIENCE 525, 529 (Samuel Kotz et al. eds., 1982); see also Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert
F. Kelly, Using Social Science Research in Family Law Analysis and Formation:
Problems and Prospects, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 631, 642 (1994).
18. The “sin” businesses that QOFs are prohibited from investing in or leasing to
include a golf course, country club, massage parlor, hot tub facility, suntan facility,
racetrack or other facility used for gambling, or liquor store. See I.R.C. §
144(c)(6)(B); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.1400Z-2(d)(3)(A)(iii); 85 Fed. Reg. 1,866, 1,929–
30 (Jan. 13, 2020).
19. Reid S. Vardell, Note, The Land of Opportunity Zones: Deferring Taxable
Capital Gains Through Investments in Low-Income Communities, 84 MO. L. REV.
915, 927 (2019).
20. BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URB. INST., AN EARLY ASSESSMENT OF
OPPORTUNITY ZONES FOR EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS: NINE
OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF THE INCENTIVE TO DATE 11 (2020) [hereinafter
THEODOS
ET
AL.,
EARLY
ASSESSMENT],
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/102348/early-assessment-of-ozsfor-equitable-development-projects_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/83DJ-2FQV] (observing
that the Empowerment Zones program that included “tax incentives for business
expansion, required cities to prepare 10-year strategic revitalization plans in
consultation with the community. The Community Development Block Grant
program requires cities to prepare” plans that seek “participation by residents of lowand moderate-income neighborhoods”).
21. The LIHTC provides for a tax credit equal to the “applicable percentage” of
the qualified basis of each qualified low-income building. See I.R.C. §§ 42(a)–(b).
The tax credit functions as a supply-side subsidy for affordable housing and is the
largest federal subsidy for affordable housing production. See Tracy A. Kaye,
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state’s housing finance agency (HFA) to develop a qualified
allocation plan that prioritizes certain types of projects over others,22
based on input from the public.23
Also as described in Part II, the developer, The Habitat Company,
is using both qualified opportunity funds and low-income housing tax
credits to finance the different phases of the Ogden Commons
project, and OZ funding for the initial commercial building phase and
LIHTCs for the subsequent residential phases of the project. This
unique feature of the Ogden Commons project allows for comparing
and contrasting these very different tax incentives in Part III. This
comparison was the subject matter of the Fordham Urban Law
Journal’s Symposium panel entitled A Comparative Lens: Analyzing
Place-Based Initiatives, where this case study was first presented.
After discussing community impact and engagement in Part IV,
this Article concludes by observing based on this and other case
studies, that community engagement and community benefit only
arise when a project’s other funding sources require it or when anchor
institutions, particularly nonprofit organizations, are involved in the
project. This is not satisfactory, as community engagement is
necessary for the success of the OZ tax incentive program. A letter
signed by the Presidents’ Council on Impact Investing24 summarizes
this sentiment:
[S]uccess will require clear opportunities for community engagement
to ensure local context and priorities are front-and-center in every
Opportunity Zone. Indeed, success hinges on the extent to which
Opportunity Zones enable current residents to engage and equitably
participate in defining how new investments ultimately reshape and
strengthen the physical, social and economic fabric of their
communities.25

Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax Code: The Low-Income Housing Credit, 38 VILL.
L. REV. 871, 878 (1993).
22. See I.R.C. § 42(m).
23. See, e.g., Ed Gramlich, Qualified Allocation Plan, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS.
COAL., https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/2014AG-259.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8NCF8BV] (last visited June 1, 2021).
24. The Presidents’ Council on Impact Investing includes the heads of 19 leading
U.S. foundations, holding greater than $80 billion in combined assets, that share a
commitment to social impact investing. See Our Partners, U.S. IMPACT INVESTING
ALL., http://impinvalliance.org/partners [https://perma.cc/ZM7T-ETDS] (last visited
Sept. 19, 2021).
25. The U.S. Impact Investing All., Government and Investors Seek to Lift
Opportunity Zones, but Communities Will Define Success, PR NEWSWIRE (June 25,
2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/government-and-

1072

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

Thus, requirements for community engagement and benefit must
be made explicit as part of OZ reform legislation. One proposal
previously put forward involves competitively awarding grants to
certified Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs)
and qualified nonprofit housing organizations to partner with QOFs
on an affordable housing project or a mixed-use project such as the
Ogden Commons project.26 CDFIs have a long history of working
and engaging with low-income communities.27 Other scholars’
proposals mentioned in Part IV should also be considered, but under
no circumstance should this tax incentive be continued without
serious reforms. Unfortunately, the legislation currently proposed in
Congress is focusing predominantly on reporting requirements to
assess the impact of designation as an Opportunity Zone rather than
mandating community engagement or community impact.28
I. THE OGDEN COMMONS PROJECT
A. North Lawndale Neighborhood, Chicago

Understanding the Ogden Commons project requires situating it in
the context of the larger North Lawndale community located on
Chicago’s West Side. A predominantly Black community29 with a

investors-seek-to-lift-opportunity-zones-but-communities-will-define-success300873922.html [https://perma.cc/Z7ZN-JMVJ].
26. See Michelle D. Layser et al., Mitigating Housing Instability During a
Pandemic, 99 OR. L. REV. 445, 513–14 (2021); see also infra notes 216–18 and
accompanying text.
27. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 35 (noting that CDFIs
“have a long track record of making substantial investments in low-income
communities”).
28. See, e.g., Improving and Reinstating the Monitoring, Prevention,
Accountability, Certification, and Transparency Provisions of Opportunity Zones
(IMPACT Act), S. 2994, 116th Cong. (2019) (expanding reporting requirements and
impact tracking for OZ’s across the country); S. 1344, 116th Cong. (2019) (requiring
Treasury to collect data and issue a report on the OZ tax incentives). But see
Community Development in Opportunity Zones Act of 2020, H.R. 7262, 116th Cong.
(2020) (allowing qualified opportunity funds to invest in community development
financial institutions); see also Opportunity Zone Reporting and Reform Act, S.
2787, 116th Cong. (2019) (imposing certain use restrictions on OZ incentives such as
requiring housing projects to incorporate certain rent and income limits in addition to
requiring the reporting of the impact of a designated opportunity zone in relation to
jobs, business, housing costs, and income distribution).
29. See N. LAWNDALE CMTY. COORDINATING COUNCIL, NORTH LAWNDALE: THE
NEXT CHAPTER 1 (2018) [hereinafter QUALITY-OF-LIFE PLAN 2018],
https://nlcccplanning.org/home-3/north-lawndale-the-next-chapter-quality-of-lifeplan/ [https://perma.cc/GK27-XC4X] (“This is a primarily African-American
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median household income of $28,327 (less than half that of the city of
Chicago),30 that has seen a 19% decrease in population since 2000,31 it
is exactly the type of community that Opportunity Zone investment is
supposed to target. Racially discriminatory real estate practices since
the 1960s led to disinvestment such that “[t]he population is about a
third of where it was at the height, and storefronts and homes have
been demolished or abandoned.”32 In 1960, North Lawndale had
over 125,000 residents, whereas by 2018 the population had shrunk to
approximately 35,000.33 With a high unemployment rate of 15.9%,34 a
high percentage of renters35 almost half of whom are housing cost
burdened,36 and only 14% of the residents having attained a
bachelor’s degree or higher,37 this neighborhood is suffering.
Nevertheless, this community has a lot to offer.38 There are
“beautiful greystones and other historic buildings, wide boulevards
and the 218-acre Douglas Park.”39 North Lawndale is close to
transportation, downtown Chicago, and the University of Illinois at

community, and it has been since the 1960s, when families relocated to North
Lawndale during the Great Migration.”).
30. See CHI. METRO. AGENCY FOR PLAN., NORTH LAWNDALE: COMMUNITY DATA
SNAPSHOT CHICAGO COMMUNITY AREA SERIES JUNE 2021 RELEASE 3, 5 (2021)
[hereinafter
CMTY.
DATA
SNAPSHOT:
NORTH
LAWNDALE],
https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/documents/10180/126764/North+Lawndale.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VS4-W6MC] (in 2018 dollars). These snapshots are “a series of
data profiles for every county, municipality, and Chicago Community Area” that
“primarily feature data from the [2014–2018] American Community Survey (ACS)
five-year estimates, although other data” comes from multiple sources “includ[ing]
the U.S. Census Bureau, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), Illinois
Department of Employment Security (IDES), Illinois Department of Revenue
(IDR) . . . and [the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning] itself.” Id. at 2.
31. See id. at 3.
32. QUALITY-OF-LIFE PLAN 2018, supra note 29, at 1 (“Several of our schools
have been shuttered, and too many families live in poverty or are affected by violence
and crime.”).
33. See id. at 3.
34. See CMTY. DATA SNAPSHOT: NORTH LAWNDALE, supra note 30, at 9.
35. See id. at 6 (76% with 11,075 occupied housing units, 8,350 of which are
renter-occupied).
36. See American Community Survey Tenure by Housing Costs as a Percentage
of Income in the Past 12 Months, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B25106&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACS
DT5Y2017.B25106&hidePreview=false.
37. See CMTY. DATA SNAPSHOT: NORTH LAWNDALE, supra note 30, at 4.
38. See QUALITY-OF-LIFE PLAN 2018, supra note 29, at 1 (“From a base for the
northern civil rights movement to a hub of industry, North Lawndale is a culturally
rich community area with unique architectural character and historic significance. We
have a strong sense of community and an abundance of local leaders.”).
39. Id.
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Chicago.40 It is part of the INVEST South/West, “a community
improvement initiative under Mayor Lori E. Lightfoot to marshal the
resources of multiple City departments, community organizations,
and corporate and philanthropic partners toward 10 communities on
Chicago’s South and West Sides.”41
The community is also home to two anchor institutions that made
this redevelopment possible, the nonprofit Mount Sinai Hospital42
and the Cinespace Film Production Studio.43 As part of the Sinai
Health System, Mount Sinai Hospital prides itself with “over a
century caring for people living in the most underserved communities
on Chicago’s West and Southwest sides, many disproportionately
affected by illness, poverty and other social challenges.”44 The 11acre mixed-use development known as Ogden Commons resulted
from a partnership of these anchor institutions, the Chicago Housing
Authority, and a developer called The Habitat Company, as well as
the involvement of PNC bank.45

40. See id.
41. CITY OF CHI. DEP’T. OF HOUS., 2021 QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 18 (2021),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/doh/qap/qap_2021/QAP_May_24_20
21.pdf [https://perma.cc/6M5K-TGA3].
42. Mount Sinai Hospital (MSH) is a nonprofit hospital, part of the Sinai Health
System, located on Chicago’s West Side that “provides an array of medical, surgical,
pharmaceutical, behavioral health, and diagnostic services. MSH is a level 1 trauma
center and provides care to 44,000 emergency department and 2,400 trauma patients
annually.” SINAI URB. HEALTH INST. MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL 2019 COMMUNITY
HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT 4 (2019) [hereinafter SINAI 2019 CHNA],
https://www.sinaichicago.org/en/community-health-needs-assessments-chna-andcommunity-health-improvement-plan-chip/ [https://perma.cc/BKN5-6NMR] (last
visited Aug. 23, 2021). “The SHS service area largely comprises communities of color
that face historic disinvestment and marginalization, oftentimes due to racist policies
and practices. This history has resulted in staggering differences in health between
the communities we serve and our well-resourced neighbors.” Id. at 1.
43. The Cinespace produces TV shows such as Chicago Med, Chicago Fire, and
Empire.
See
CINESPACE
CHI.
FILM
STUDIOS,
https://www.chicagofilmstudios.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/UCE8-D7E2] (last
visited Aug. 23, 2021); see also CINESPACE CHI. FILM STUDIOS,
https://www.chicagofilmstudios.com/credits [https://perma.cc/H5LV-LYS3]. “As part
of its proposal, Habitat is partnering with SHS and Cinespace, two leading
stakeholders and property owners in the community.” Minutes of the Regular
Meeting of the Commissioners of the Chicago Housing Authority, Item 14 (June 20,
2017) (on file with author) [hereinafter CHA Minutes 2017].
44. Press Release, Sinai Health Sys., Sinai Health System Receives $7 Million
From CARES Act for Ambulatory Surgery Center at Ogden Commons (June 18,
2020) [hereinafter SHS Press Release] (quoting Karen Teitelbaum, President and
CEO of Sinai Health System).
45. See CHA Minutes 2017, supra note 43 (noting that “[t]he resolution for Item
14 approves the selection of The Habitat Company LLC, Sinai Health System (SHS)
and Cinespace Chicago Film Studios (Cinespace) as the development team for the
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B. OZ Census Tract 8433

The Ogden Commons project is located in OZ census tract 8433 in
Cook County, Illinois, one of 181 Opportunity Zones in this county.46
This census tract includes a high concentration of Black and Latinx
residents,47 a high poverty rate of about 46%,48 and a high
unemployment rate of 15%,49 as well as a high percentage of renters
who are housing cost burdened.50 Exactly the type of statistics that

redevelopment of Lawndale Complex and Ogden Courts East; and approves a
Redevelopment Agreement for Lawndale Complex and Ogden Courts East”); see
also Sibley Fleming, Can Affordable Projects Fill the Gaps with OZ Funds?, MULTIHOUS. NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.multihousingnews.com/post/canaffordable-projects-fill-the-gaps-with-oz-funds/
[https://perma.cc/6KRU-G6LK]
(“The financing was executed through PNC Bank, which provided the first mortgage,
as well as access to its large Opportunity Zone fund.”). As an aside, in 1987 Judge
Aspen appointed The Habitat Company, a private real estate firm, as the “receiver to
take over the development of all new family public housing units” as part of the
judgment in the landmark Gautreaux case, which alleged that the Chicago Housing
Authority’s site and tenant selection was racially discriminatory. William P. Wilen &
Wendy L. Stasell, Gautreaux and Chicago’s Public Housing Crisis:

The Conflict Between Achieving Integration and Providing Decent Housing for Very
Low-Income African Americans, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 117, 125 (2000).
46. See List of Illinois Opportunity Zones & OZ Funds, OPPORTUNITY ZONES
DATABASE, https://opportunitydb.com/location/illinois/cook/ [https://perma.cc/9NMJ5DMU] (last visited May 27, 2021); see also Census Tract 8433, Chicago, Illinois,
supra note 14.
47. See American Community Survey on Race, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B02001&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACS
DT5Y2017.B02001&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (listing the
minority population (non-white) is 64.93% and, of the 2,144 residents, 1,184 identify
as Black).
48. See American Community Survey on Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months by
Sex
by
Age,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
table?q=%28B17001%29&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B17001
&hidePreview=false (finding the poverty rate is 45.90% for 2017) (last visited Sept.
19, 2021).
49. See American Community Survey on Employment Status, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=employment&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=
ACSST5Y2017.S2301&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (listing an
unemployment rate of 15% for 2017).
50. See American Community Survey on Tenure, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B25003&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACS
DT5Y2017.B25003&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (finding
approximately 75% of the units are renter occupied); see also American Community

Survey on Tenure by Housing Costs as a Percentage of Household Income in the Past
12
Months,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/
table?q=B25106&g=1400000US17031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B25106&hidePrev
iew=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (finding approximately 46% of these renters are
housing cost burdened (rents greater than 30% of their income)).
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demonstrate a need for investment in this census tract.51 The median
household income for this census tract was $47,82952 and the per
capita income was $14,140.53 The median household income for this
census tract was $50,48654 and the per capita income was $18,222.55
These statistics compare unfavorably to $62,843 median income and
$34,103 per capita income across the United States in 2019 and
$58,247 and $37,103 respectively in Chicago.56
On February 17, 2017, the Chicago Housing Authority issued an
Opportunity Notice of Proposal for a mixed-use and mixed-income
development of approximately six acres of land located at 1401 South
Washtenaw, 2600 West Ogden Ave, and 1321 South Washtenaw.57 A
three-member team evaluated the five proposals received and
recommended the Ogden Commons development proposal submitted
by The Habitat Company LLC, Sinai Health System (SHS) and

51. However, there is longstanding debate over the “tension between providing
adequate housing for very low-income African Americans and the ideal of
integrating them into white communities.” Wilen & Stasell, supra note 45, at 117.
Chicago is at the forefront of this debate with respect to the future development of
three of its former public housing developments (Henry Horner, Cabrini-Green and
ABLA). See id. at 118. This is evidenced by the entanglement of the Horner, Cabrini,
and ABLA lawsuits with the desegregation case of Gautreaux v. Chicago Public
Housing Authority, which places restrictions on public housing built in communities
with substantial Black populations. See id. at 119, 123.
52. See American Community Survey on Median Household Income in the Past
12 Months (In 2017 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19013%29&g=1400000US17031843300&
tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B19013&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021).
53. See American Community Survey on Per Capita Income in the Past 12
Months (In 2017 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19301%29&g=1400000US17031843300&
tid=ACSDT5Y2017.B19301&hidePreview=false (last visited Sept. 19, 2021).
54. See American Community Survey on Median Household Income in the Past
12 Months (In 2019 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19013%29&g=0100000US_1400000US1
7031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2019.B19013&hidePreview=true (last visited Sept. 19,
2021).
55. See American Community Survey On Per Capita Income in the Past 12
Months (In 2019 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=%28B19301%29&g=0100000US_1400000US1
7031843300&tid=ACSDT5Y2019.B19301&hidePreview=true (last visited Sept. 19,
2021).
56. See American Community Survey QuickFacts for Chicago City, Illinois, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/chicagocityillinois/
INC110219#INC110219 [https://perma.cc/A5SZ-HY4Q] (last visited Aug. 23, 2021).
57. See Contract for Redevelopment of Ogden Courts East and Lawndale
Complex 1 (Sept. 14, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Redevelopment
Contract].
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Cinespace Chicago Film Studios.58 The Chicago Housing Authority
and Ogden Commons JV LLC, basically Habitat, Mount Sinai, and
Cinespace, entered into a redevelopment agreement on September
14, 2018.59 “Together, SHS and Cinespace are adding an additional
5.5 acres of adjacent land to the redevelopment target area.”60 So, by
the very nature of this partnership, the community was involved in
this redevelopment plan even though the OZ legislation requires no
such community engagement.61 The Chicago Housing Authority’s
proposal process also subjected the Ogden Commons development
proposal to a competitive screening not required by the OZ tax
incentive. Partnership with the Chicago Housing Authority triggered
other obligations and mandated various approvals by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).62
Note that this development project was initiated even before the
OZ tax incentive came into law.63 The West Baltimore case study

58. See id.; CHA Minutes 2017, supra note 43 (“RESOLUTION NO. 2017-CHA73 WHEREAS, the Board of Commissioners has reviewed the Board Letter dated
June 20, 2017 entitled ‘Authorization to 1) Approve The Habitat Company LLC,
Sinai Health System and Cinespace Chicago Film Studios as the development team
for the redevelopment of Lawndale Complex and Ogden Courts East; 2) Negotiate
and enter into a Redevelopment Agreement for Lawndale Complex and Ogden
Courts East . . . .’”).
59. See Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 1 (“OGDEN COMMONS JV
LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (the ‘Developer’) whose members are
Habitat Ogden Commons LLC, . . . Lawndale Ogden Development LLC, . . . and
Ogden Commons MSH LLX . . . .” The Habitat Company LLC, Mount Sinai
Hospital Medical Center of Chicago, and Cinespace Chicago Film Studios LLC, “by
and through its affiliate LAWNDALE REAL ESTATE, LLC, . . . have an ownership
interest in the member entities of the Developer . . . .”).
60. CHA minutes 2017, supra note 43. “Three acres are owned by SHS and 2.5acre parcel of land owned by Cinespace. With the addition of privately held land to
the east and west of the CHA site, Ogden Commons development proposal
encompasses a total of 10.9 acres.” Id.
61. See Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 20.
The Developer has worked and will continue to work with the [Chicago
Housing] Authority to involve residents and resident organizations in the
planning and redevelopment process for the Development. If requested by
the Authority, the Developer shall provide quarterly updates on the
redevelopment process and shall participate in meetings on the planning,
development and construction process, giving careful consideration to
residents’ suggestions.
Id. at 15.
62. See id. at 8 (“The Developer, all of the Sponsors and the Authority agree to
cooperate in good faith to obtain all necessary approvals from HUD.”).
63. See Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/credits-deductions/opportunity-zones-frequently-askedquestions#qoz-business [https://perma.cc/BP7S-ZD5P] (last visited June 10, 2021)
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also noted that many projects were “well into the development
process before incorporating OZ” funding.64 Prior to construction,
Ogden Commons was the site of two public housing projects, the
Chicago Housing Authority’s Ogden Courts and the Lawndale
Complex public housing project, which were demolished in 2005 and
2000, respectively.65 In November 2018, the Chicago Planning
Commission approved this mixed-use redevelopment of the Chicago
Housing Authority’s site and private land.66 There are plans for office
and retail space as well as mixed-income housing.67 As the President
of The Habitat Co. asserted, “Not only will it bring the first new
outpatient facilities to the area in more than 20 years, but the project
will also add new restaurants, a bank, office space, and much-needed
affordable housing — all while creating jobs and building the local
economy.”68 Thus, the new commercial building will provide the
community with additional health resources, a branch of Wintrust
Bank, as well as a Steak ’n Shake franchise, Momentum Coffee, and
Ja’ Grill restaurant — all minority-owned.69
The top two floors are leased by the Mount Sinai Surgical &
Ambulatory Care Center enabling the Sinai Health System to offer
greater access to much needed outpatient surgical services70

(listing Question 3, which states, as an answer, “[t]he first set of QOZ designations,
covering parts of 18 states, were designated on April 9, 2018”).
64. Michael Snidal & Sandra Newman, Missed Opportunity: The West Baltimore
Opportunity Zones Story 25 (Feb. 19, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Snidal-Newman-BrookingsDraft-Feb-19-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX5L-XWAP].
65. See Work Begins on Replacement for North Lawndale Public Housing, CHI.
ARCHITECT (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.chicagoarchitecture.org/2020/03/09/workbegins-on-replacement-for-north-lawndale-public-housing/ [https://perma.cc/HT3WFBSR] (a loss of approximately 327 units of housing); see also THE CHI. HOUS.
AUTH., CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY: MTW ANNUAL REPORT FY2001,
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/CHAFY2001-ANNUAL-REPORT.PDF
[https://perma.cc/8KP8-JWEX] (last visited Aug. 12, 2021).
66. See Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 7.
67. See id.
68. Christine Serlin, Mixed-Use Development Breaks Ground in Chicago
Opportunity
Zone,
AFFORDABLE
HOUS.
FIN.
(Mar.
12,
2020),
https://www.housingfinance.com/developments/mixed-use-development-breaksground-in-chicago-opportunity-zone_o [https://perma.cc/7XCM-8UMP] (quoting
Matt Fiascone, President of The Habitat Co.).
69. See Jay Koziarz, First Phase of Mixed-Use Ogden Commons Project Opens in
North
Lawndale,
URBANIZE
CHI.
(June
16,
2021,
2:31
PM),
https://urbanize.city/chicago/post/first-phase-mixed-use-ogden-commons-projectopens-north-lawndale [https://perma.cc/8BZ7-LY85].
70. See id.; see also SHS Press Release, supra note 44.
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determined from surveying the community.71 The Sinai Health
System also decided to expand the much-utilized dialysis program,
“greatly needed due to the disproportionate burden of kidney disease
in the community.”72 The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the
health disparities in underserved communities such as North
Lawndale.73 The Mount Sinai Surgical & Ambulatory Care Center in
the Ogden Commons project will help to address some of these health
inequities.
The Ogden Commons Community Council (OCCC) was created
with monthly meetings beginning July 29, 2020, to advise on plans for
the Surgical & Ambulatory Care Center with respect to such issues as
wrap around hospitality services (including possible valet parking
service and transportation services) and the design of a comfortable
and user-friendly space. The OCCC will also “engage the broader
community to solicit their ideas and better understand their needs to
enhance the patient and client experience.”74 The commercial
building that houses the Surgical & Ambulatory Care Center is
expected to open in late 2021.
The projected completion date of the entire Ogden Commons
project is 2026.75 The residential component will start construction

71. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires taxexempt hospitals to conduct a Community Health Needs Assessments (CHNA) and
Community Health Improvement Plan (CHIP) every three years. See Requirements
for 501(c)(3) Hospitals Under the Affordable Care Act — Section 501(r), INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitableorganizations/requirements-for-501c3-hospitals-under-the-affordable-care-actsection-501r [https://perma.cc/VA9E-J773] (last visited Sept. 20, 2021). This CHNA is
developed with community stakeholders and assesses the health of the communities
served. See Community Health Needs Assessment for Charitable Hospital
Organizations
—
Section
501(r)(3),
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/community-health-needs-assessment-forcharitable-hospital-organizations-section-501r3 [https://perma.cc/D6HS-SF4V] (last
visited Sept. 20, 2021).
72. SHS Press Release, supra note 44.
73. Id. COVID-19 patients in the communities served by Mount Sinai had
mortality rates of 17% versus 4.5% in Chicago. Id.
74. Ogden Commons Community Council Mission Statement (on file with
author) (“The primary goals of the Ogden Commons Community Council are . . . [t]o
give guidance, feedback and input on key areas of the Ogden Commons
project[,] . . . [t]o provide the voice of community residents and patients[,] . . . [t]o
provide on-going feedback and recommendations to Sinai leaders overseeing the
Ogden Commons project.”).
75. See Press Release, City of Chi., Off. of the Mayor, Mayor Lightfoot
Celebrates Accomplishments of Invest South/West on One Year Anniversary (Oct.
26, 2020) [hereinafter Invest South/West Press Release].
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later in 2021.76 The first residential phase is a 110 unit “building with
community activity space and an exterior children’s play area” that
includes studios, one-bedroom, two-bedroom, and three-bedroom
units.77 Forty percent of the units will be set aside for those on the
housing authority waiting list. Chicago Housing Authority projectbased vouchers will allow targeting of tenants to “pay an incomebased rent equal to the greater of 30% of the household’s adjusted
monthly income or 10% of actual gross monthly income, less a utility
allowance.”78 Furthermore, 50% of the units will be set aside for
tenants at or below 60% or 80% of current area median income
(AMI) and the final 10% will be unrestricted.79 The second phase
will provide an additional 77 units in 2022.80
II. FINANCING OF THE OGDEN COMMONS PROJECT
A. Qualified Opportunity Funds

So how was this $200 million project financed? The commercial
building phase of the project used OZ funds totaling $12.5 million
from a qualified opportunity fund of PNC Bank as well as a $3 million

76. Updates, OGDEN COMMONS, https://www.ogdencommonschicago.com/
[https://perma.cc/NEZ4-AW93] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021) (“Construction of the
residential component will begin in the fall of 2021.”).
77. Tenant Selection Plan: Ogden Commons Chicago, Illinois, CHI. HOUS. AUTH.
[hereinafter
Tenant
Selection
Plan],
https://cha-assets.s3.us-east2.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/202105/1.%202020%20TSP%20Ogden%20Commons.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PGJ-J2BA]
(last visited Aug. 23, 2021).
78. Id. at 10. “These vouchers come from the transfer of assistance subsidies from
a public housing site transitioning through HUD’s Rental Assistance Demonstration
(RAD) program and called ‘RAD PBV Units’.” Id. at 1.
79. See Email from Jeff Head, Vice President of Dev., The Habitat Co. LLC, to
author (May 4, 2021, 12:20 PM) (on file with author). Eighty-nine units are set aside
for households with incomes no more than 60% of AMI and 11 units for households
with incomes no more than 80% of AMI, “as established by the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit Program rules and regulations for the appropriate household
size.” Tenant Selection Plan, supra note 77, at 10.
80. See KRISTIN FAUST, ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH., REPORT OF ACTIVITIES FOR
FY2020 AND PROJECTED ACITVITIES FOR FY 2021 25 (Feb. 26, 2020) (on file with
author) [hereinafter FY2020 GOVERNOR’S REPORT IHDA]; see also WICS/WRSP
Staff, Illinois Awards $29 Million in Tax Credits for Affordable Housing, ABC 20
(May 21, 2021), https://newschannel20.com/news/local/illinois-awards-29-million-intax-credits-for-affordable-housing
[https://perma.cc/P3GS-ASW9]
(“Ogden
Commons A-2: The Habitat Company will begin ‘Phase II’ of a mixed-use, mixedincome development in North Lawndale. The 77-unit new construction building is
located near Mt. Sinai Hospital, Cinespace Film Studios.”).
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first mortgage from the bank.81 The OZ tax incentives do not come
with any requirements to benefit the community82 even though it is
clear that in order “to help distressed communities, there must be an
affirmative effort for investments to reflect the needs of the residents
within those communities.”83 The West Baltimore case study found
that although the OZ tax incentive is “stimulating investment
conversations . . . it is failing at oversight and community engagement
and not changing development outcomes.”84
The Ogden Commons developer, The Habitat Co., had a great deal
of trouble attracting qualified Opportunity Zone funding because
“mission-oriented projects struggle to compete for attention with
higher return projects.”85 According to the West Baltimore study,
“most OZ funds are seeking market rate returns on the same types of
investments that other funds are making regardless of the OZ
incentive.”86 An Urban Institute study found that “most developers
and investors view OZ incentives as providing a relatively small boost
to overall returns.”87 The West Baltimore study interviews and
“reviews of project proformas indicate[d] that OZ’s year-five and
year-seven step-up basis advantages” were not considered valuable to
investors.88 The West Baltimore study also noted that the OZ
investment funds were seeking internal rates of return (IRR) between
10–16%, while projects in Baltimore’s distressed neighborhoods were
generating IRRs no greater than 3–6%.89 In brief, the tax incentive is
too weak to entice investors into these severely distressed

81. Serlin, supra note 68.
82. See THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at V (“As OZ
incentives are not structured to encourage resident or community engagement,
mission-oriented projects struggle to compete for attention with higher-return
projects — for which OZs provide much larger subsidies because of the design of the
incentives.”).
83. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 472–73. “Critics have also noted that incentives
can be accessed without community input or any process of prioritization where local
governments can ensure alignment with localized goals.” THEODOS ET AL., EARLY
ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 2.
84. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 3.
85. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4. “[M]any missionoriented actors are struggling to access capital. Many project sponsors are struggling
to access the class of investors — wealthy individuals and corporations with capital
gains — for whom the OZ incentives are tailored.” Id.
86. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 25.
87. THEODOS ET AL., supra note 20, at 4. “The OZ incentives have had mixed
effects in terms of making projects work that would not otherwise happen.” Id. at VI.
88. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 26 (reporting that “[o]ne Baltimore
developer described them as ‘worthless’”).
89. See id. at 25.
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neighborhoods even with an anchor tenant like Mount Sinai
Hospital.90 Finally, The Habitat Co. reached out to PNC Bank. This
is a mission-driven investment for the bank,91 and the project helps it
to satisfy its Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements.92
The OZ money available for such projects is not enough to enable
these projects to work financially without many additional sources of
funding. The Urban Institute study confirmed that “mission-oriented
projects succeed in using OZs when the capital stack also layered in
significant other subsidy sources.”93 In the case of the Ogden
Commons commercial building phase of the project, the City of
Chicago awarded a $2.5 million Neighborhood Opportunity Fund
grant for the developer to outfit the interior of the building for the
two restaurants, Steak ‘n Shake and Ja’ Grill — both minority-owned
businesses.94 This funding required The Habitat Co. to have at least
90. See THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4 (“[M]any
mission-oriented projects yield below-market returns that most OZ investors appear
unwilling to accept.”).
91. See Serlin, supra note 68 (“‘As the first to go to market with our Opportunity
Zone Fund, we were able to work with the city of Chicago, the CHA, and Habitat to
equitably reinvest in a project on Chicago’s West Side, which will provide affordable
community health care, small business growth, job creation, and other positive
economic impact,’ said Thurman ‘Tony’ Smith, PNC senior vice president and
community development market manager in Chicago.”).
92. “Under the CRA regulation in effect for OCC-supervised banks until October
1, 2020, loans, investments, or services in an opportunity zone transaction may be
eligible for CRA consideration if they meet the definition of community
development. Community development includes . . . community services targeted to
LMI individuals . . . .” OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENTS
FACT
SHEET:
OPPORTUNITY
ZONES
(2020),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/communityaffairs/community-developments-fact-sheets/cd-fact-sheet-opportunity-zones.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F3HX-2B8S] (footnote omitted) (citing 12 C.F.R § 25.12(g) (2019)
(national banks) and 12 C.F.R. § 195.12(g) (FSAs)).
93. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4 (stating “when a
well-connected project sponsor was able to locate an investor willing to accept
significantly below-market returns”).
94. See Chi., Ill., Ordinance 02019-2578, Ordinance for Redevelopment
Agreement with Ogden Washtenaw JV LLC. for grant and expenditure of
Neighborhoods Opportunity Funds at 2632 W Ogden Ave, 2638 Ogden Ave and 2646
W Ogden Ave (2019); see also Press Release, Off. of the Mayor, City of Chi., Mayor
Emanuel Announces Two Retail Tenants Coming to Ogden Commons (Mar. 15,
2019),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/mayor/Press%20Room/
Press%20Releases/2019/March/RetailOgdenCommons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JV45MCW7] (“Two African-American-Owned Restaurants [Steak ‘n Shake and Ja’ Grill]
will offer first sit-down restaurants . . . and help boost new commercial development
in the community.”). “‘The City’s Neighborhood Opportunity Fund and Mayor
Lightfoot’s transformative vision for North Lawndale has made it possible for me to
bring my business to Ogden Commons,’ said Melvin Buckley, owner/franchisee of the
Ogden Commons Steak ‘n Shake.” Invest South/West Press Release, supra note 75.

2021]

OGDEN COMMONS CASE STUDY

1083

26% Minority Business Enterprise and 6% Woman Business
Enterprise participation for the project’s direct and indirect costs of
construction.95 Furthermore, “[c]ity residents must perform 50% of
al! [sic] construction hours.”96
As part of the Chicago mayor’s commitment to addressing
healthcare deserts,97 Mount Sinai’s North Lawndale Surgical &
Ambulatory Care Center was awarded $7 million from Community
Development Block Grant money that became available as part of
the CARES Act funding for the City of Chicago.98 This funding also
came with certain requirements that were intended to benefit the
community residents.99 So, the Ogden Commons case study as well as
the other case studies discussed in this Article demonstrates that
social-impact projects require multiple sources of funding (capital
stacking). Fortunately, the other funding sources, whether federal,
state, local, or philanthropic, are accompanied by rules requiring
community benefits such as affordable housing, employment, or
social services for the local residents.100

95. Application of an Amendment to the Chicago Zoning Ordinance, City of Chi.
(Aug.
31,
2020),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/
zlup/Planning_and_Policy/Agendas/cpc_materials/11_2020/Zoning%20Amendment
%20Application%20-%20PD%201430%20Amendment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KUU3-F2DA] (attaching an ordinance to be amended, which holds
that there must be a certain amount of minority-owned and women-owned
businesses).
96. NOF Conditional Award Letter from David Reifman, Comm’r, Dep’t of Plan.
& Dev., to Jeff Head, Ogden Washtenaw JV LLC (Mar. 7, 2019).
97. See Invest South/West Press Release, supra note 75.
98. See SHS Press Release, supra note 44. “The funding allocation was approved
by the City Council on June 17th.” Id.
99. Kelly Bauer, Auburn Gresham, North Lawndale Getting $11 Million For New
Health Centers, BLOCK CLUB (June 29, 2020, 4:07 PM CDT),
https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/06/29/auburn-gresham-north-lawndale-getting-11million-for-new-health-centers/ [https://perma.cc/47TP-QPRW] (“The center will be
30,000 square feet and will help Mount Sinai Health System provide health care on
the West Side.”).
100. See THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at VI. “Maryland
offers enhancements to other state tax credit programs for qualified OZ businesses if
they agree to provide the state with transaction-level reporting, and additional

enhancement for projects that have a community benefits agreement or community
residents on their governing/advisory board and provide a resolution/letter from their
locality or county.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (citing Maryland Opportunity Zone
Enhancement Credits, MD. DEP’T COM., https://commerce.maryland.gov/fund/
programs-for-businesses/opportunity-zone-enhancement-credits
[https://perma.cc/D5F5-RWEN] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020)).
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B. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program

The residential component of the project utilizes LIHTCs,101 which
do come with requirements about the affordability of the housing
produced.102 Since its inception, the LIHTC program has supported
the construction or rehabilitation of over 3 million housing units.103
Although a federal tax incentive, the program is predominately
administered by the appropriate state HFA.104 Most tax credit units
are produced by for-profit developers who typically sell shares in the
project, either through large public offerings or private placements
and other partnership arrangements, to one or more outside
investors.105 Primarily, these investors are banks seeking to garner
CRA points.106 These investors then claim the tax credits over ten
years.107

101. The LIHTC was enacted as part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99514, and has been modified numerous times. See generally Kaye, supra note 21. See
also, e.g., Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, §§
3001-05, 122 Stat. 2654, 2878–85 (temporarily increasing the per capita allocation of
LIHTCs by 10% for each state for 2008 and 2009). The ceiling was also increased by
12.5% for 2019, 2020, and 2021 over concern about a potential drop in demand for
LIHTCs by corporate and financial institutional investors because of the reduction in
the corporate tax rate by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. See generally
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348.
102. See I.R.C. §§ 42(g)(l)–(2). See also infra notes 122–23 and text accompanying
for more details on the mandated affordability of the housing.
103. See
LIHTC
Database,
HUD
USER,
https://lihtc.huduser.gov/
[https://perma.cc/ZM63-DW3F] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
104. See MARK KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22389, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 4 (2021).
105. See CONG. BUDGET OFF., FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE FOR LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS 6 (2015), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-20152016/reports/50782-lowincomehousing.pdf [https://perma.cc/75Y7-9S8T].
106. See Cassandra Jones Havard, The Community Reinvestment Act, Banks, and
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L.
415, 417–18 (2017). The CohnReznick study estimated that corporations invested
“approximately $10 billion of capital to finance housing credit projects in 2012, and
that approximately 85% of this capital came from the banking sector.”
COHNREZNICK LLP, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON
HOUSING
TAX
CREDIT
PRICING
10,
https://ahic.org/images/downloads/Research_and_Education/the_community_reinvest
ment_act_and_its_effect_on_housing_tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVK8-72V8] (last
visited June 11, 2021) (analyzing another CohnReznick’s report that analyzed the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program at the program’s 25th anniversary).
107. See I.R.C. § 42(f)(1). The low-income housing credit may be claimed annually,
generally over a ten-year period, by an owner of a qualified residential rental project
beginning with the taxable year in which the building is placed in service. See id.
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A taxpayer’s credit amount in any taxable year is computed by
applying the appropriate credit percentage108 to the proportion of the
eligible basis in a qualified low-income building that is attributable to
the low-income rental units.109
The LIHTC statute originally
specified that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would periodically
reset the specified credit percentages to maintain the present value of
the ten-year stream of tax credits at 70% or 30% of the qualified
basis.110 However, since 2008, Congress has specified that the
minimum credit rate for the 70% present value credit should be at
least 9%, regardless of prevailing interest rates.111 Concerned when
the credit percentage for tax-exempt financed or rehabilitation
projects dropped to a historic low of 3.07% in 2020, the 2021
Consolidated Appropriations Act112 fixed the rate for this tax credit at
4%, providing a 4% floor like the 9% floor that was previously
established for the 70% present value credit.113

108. See id. §§ 42(b)(1)(A)–(B); see also Housing and Economic Recovery Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3002, 122 Stat. 2654, 2879. This change was made
permanent in 2016. Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, §
131, 129 Stat. 2242, 3055 (2015) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 42(b)(2)). Thus, in a
low interest rate environment, the present value of the credits claimed over ten years
will exceed 70% of the qualified basis. See I.R.C. § 42(b)(1)(B)(i).
109. See I.R.C. § 42(d)(3). The eligible basis of a new building is its adjusted basis,
which includes construction costs and other costs for depreciable property
attributable to the building. Id. The cost of land, market rate units, syndication and
financing are not eligible for the credit. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH
CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 157
(Comm. Print 1987).
110. See I.R.C. §§ 42(b)(1)(A)–(B). The so-called 9% credit is generally awarded
for new construction and is intended to deliver up to a 70% subsidy. KEIGHTLEY,
supra note 104, at 1. These competitive awards “are drawn from a state’s annual
LIHTC allocation authority.” See id. at 1 n.2. The so-called 4% credit is either used
for rehabilitation projects or projects using “at least 50% in federally tax-exempt
bond financing and is designed to deliver up to a 30% subsidy.” Id. at 1. Developers
are automatically awarded 4% tax credits for the qualified tax-exempt bond financed
projects. Id. at 1 n.2. “These 4% tax credits are not drawn from a state’s annual
LIHTC allocation.” Id. The 30% and 70% subsidy levels are computed as the present
value of the 10-year stream of tax credits divided by the development’s qualified basis
(roughly the cost of construction excluding land). Id. at 1.
111. See Housing and Economic Recovery Act § 3002. This change was made
permanent in 2016. Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2016 § 131, 129 Stat. at 3055
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 42(b)(2)). Thus, in the current low interest rate
environment, the present value of the credits claimed over ten years will exceed 70%
of the qualified basis. See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 3.
112. See Pub. L. No. 116-260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020).
113. See id. § 201, 134 Stat. 3056 (amending I.R.C. § 42(b) to provide that the
applicable percentage shall not be less than 4% for 4% tax credit projects, which will
increase the amount of tax credit equity that can be raised for such projects).
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Projects financed with the proceeds of tax-exempt bonds subject to
the state volume cap under Internal Revenue Code section 146 are
not required to receive an allocation of credit authority from the
appropriate state or local HFA.114 If Housing Bonds finance at least
50% of an affordable housing development, the development is
eligible to receive the 4% LIHTC.115 Thus, for the initial phase of the
Ogden Commons residential project that is financed using tax-exempt
bonds, the project will be automatically awarded the 4% LIHTC.116
However, the developers, like The Habitat Co., must apply to receive
Housing Bond authority from the state.117 Furthermore, the project
must still satisfy the requirements for allocation of a housing credit
under the qualified allocation plan applicable to the area where the
project is located, in this case Illinois.118 In addition, in Illinois, all
projects planning to apply to the Illinois Housing Development
Authority (IHDA) for an allocation of LIHTCs must first submit a
Preliminary Project Assessment prior to submitting a full
application.119

114. See I.R.C. § 42(h)(4); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 167 (Comm. Print 1987)
(noting that exemption from the mandatory allocation requirement is provided for
buildings financed with proceeds of tax-exempt bonds).
115. For example, in FY 2019, the Illinois Housing Development Authority in
conjunction with tax-exempt bond deals allocated a total of $26,771,363 in 4%
Federal Tax Credits, totaling approximately $221,520,521, and creating 2,878 units,
2,870 of which were designated for low-income residents. See FY2020 GOVERNOR’S
REPORT IHDA, supra note 80, at 42–43.
116. Generally, any building eligible for the credit must receive an allocation of
credit authority from the state or local housing credit agency where the qualifying
low-income housing project is located. See I.R.C. § 42(h)(1).
117. The Treasury Department allocates private activity bond (PAB) authority to
state governments based on population size. States can choose to allocate a portion of
their PAB authority to issue multifamily Housing Bonds. See generally STEVEN
MAGUIRE & JOSEPH S. HUGHES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31457, PRIVATE ACTIVITY
BONDS: AN INTRODUCTION 1 (2018). For example, the IHDA received 18
applications seeking $298,332,211 to construct 2,704 units of housing through its bond
financing programs in FY 2019. During FY 2019, the Authority financed
approximately $392,058,194 for first mortgage loans on 21 multi-family developments
located in the State. See FY2020 GOVERNOR’S REPORT IHDA, supra note 80, at 9, 11.
118. See I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(D); see also id. § 42(h)(1); ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH.,
2020–2021 LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 15 (on
file with author) [hereinafter ILLINOIS QAP].
119. See Affordable Housing Tax Credit, ILL. HOUS. DEV. AUTH.,
https://www.ihda.org/developers/tax-credits/ [https://perma.cc/83FF-NDJV] (last
visited Aug. 12, 2021). “Applications for Tax Credits generated from tax-exempt
bond financed projects shall be submitted pursuant to a competitive Tax Exempt
Municipal Bond application funding round process. However, such projects must
meet the same requirements as projects applying for Tax Credits from the Credit
Ceiling. In addition, the same application is required for projects anticipating
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Each state HFA’s qualified allocation plan must include project
selection criteria such as: housing need characteristics, project
characteristics, sponsor characteristics, tenant populations with
special housing needs, and public housing waiting lists as well as
allocation preference for projects serving the lowest income tenants
or obligated to serve qualified tenants for the longest periods.120
Illinois has prioritized underserved populations, such as 1) “[l]owincome households” — particularly those “households earning below
30% of Area Median Income[,]” 2) “[l]ow- and moderate- income
persons unable to afford housing near work or transportation[,]” 3)
“[l]ow-income people residing in communities with ongoing
community revitalization efforts[,]” and 4) “[o]ther special needs
populations, including people with criminal records and veterans
experiencing or at risk of homelessness.”121
The low-income housing credit is available only on rent-restricted
units that are leased to qualifying low-income tenants.122 Residential
rental projects qualify for the tax credit only if 1) 20% or more of the
units are occupied by individuals with incomes that are no more than
50% of area median income, as adjusted for family size, or 2) 40% or
more of the units are occupied by individuals with incomes that are
no more than 60% of area median income, as adjusted for family
size.123 The 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act added a third
income test option, the ability to average the incomes of tenants when
applying the income restriction tests.124 However, no tenant’s income
can exceed 80% of the area median income.125 A qualified residential
rental project must remain as rental property with a minimum
number of rent-restricted units for at least 30 years.126

generating Tax Credits from tax-exempt bond financing as is required for projects
applying for Tax Credits from the Credit Ceiling.” CITY OF CHI. DEP’T. OF HOUS.,
2019 LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT QUALIFIED ALLOCATION PLAN 1, 4 (2019),
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/doh/qap/qap_2019/2019_qap_final.pd
f [https://perma.cc/B9KS-FD2A].
120. See I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(C).
121. ILLINOIS QAP, supra note 118, at 15–16.
122. See I.R.C. §§ 42(g)(l)–(2). Gross rent is restricted to 30% of the imputed
income limitation, which is determined by assuming a family size equivalent to 1.5
times the number of bedrooms in the housing unit. See id. § 42(g)(2).
123. See id. § 42(g)(1).
124. Pub. L. No. 115-141, § 103, 132 Stat. 348, 1157 (amending I.R.C. § 42(g))
125. See id. § 102(a), 132 Stat. at 540–41.
126. See I.R.C. §§ 42(h)(6), (i)(1). The credit is recaptured with interest from all
owners if the project fails to comply with the rent limits and set aside requirements
during this compliance period or from any owner who sells his interest in the project.
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The Habitat Co. applied for tax-exempt bond financing for the first
phase of the residential portion of the project and for the 9% LIHTC
for an additional 77 units, the second phase.127 The Illinois Housing
Authority Board members approved the 9% LIHTC for Phase II,
Ogden Commons A-2, in April 2021.128 The use of Chicago Housing
Authority seller financing and a ground lease triggered further
requirements regarding local hiring.129 Thus, the residential portion
of the Ogden Commons project is subject to many rules intended to
benefit the community.
Current barriers to using qualified opportunity funds “for
affordable housing include the law’s emphasis on increasing property
value to receive capital gains tax relief,”130 the lack of any
requirement that qualified opportunity funds adopt a social mission as
part of the self-certification process,131 and barriers to involving
nonprofits in OZ transactions.132 Developers are also unable to easily
combine OZ funding with the LIHTCs for a variety of reasons.133
Affordable housing projects do not generate the kind of return
demanded by most OZ funds, given the limited cash flow during the
15-year compliance period.134 In addition, LIHTC properties often

See id. § 42(j). Under some conditions, however, an owner may terminate this
commitment after 15 years. See id. §§ 42(h)(6)(E)–(I).
127. See FY2020 GOVERNOR’S REPORT IHDA, supra note 80, at 25; see also
WICS/WRSP Staff, supra note 80.
128. See WICS/WRSP Staff, supra note 80.
129. Telephone Interview with Jeff Head, Vice President of Dev., The Habitat Co.
LLC (Feb. 19, 2021) (on file with author).
130. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473 (citing Edward W. De Barbieri,
Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 82 (2020)).
131. See Edward W. De Barbieri, Opportunism Zones, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
82, 154 (2020).
132. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473; see also Michelle D. Layser, Nonprofit
Participation in Place-Based Tax Incentive Transactions, 48 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
(forthcoming Oct. 2021) [hereinafter Layser, Nonprofit Participation] (“The
requirement that Opportunity Funds make equity investments presents a significant
barrier to using Opportunity Funds to support the activities of tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations.”).
133. See generally Glenn A. Graff, Issues and Opportunities When Combining
Opportunity Zones and LIHTC, NOVOGRADAC J. TAX CREDITS, Apr. 2019,
https://www.att-law.com/wp-content/uploads/BLOG/Issues-and-OpportunitiesWhen-Combining-Opportunity-Zones-and-LIHTC-article.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/BL77-6P7G].
134. See Jeff Head, Can Tax Credits and Opportunity Zones Be Combined? Yes
But . . . , NAT’L APARTMENT ASS’N (Dec. 2019), https://www.naahq.org/newspublications/units/december-2019/article/can-tax-credits-and-opportunity-zones-becombined-yes- [https://perma.cc/7R3A-FGZX]. “A further challenge for missionoriented projects is that the sponsors are seeking to support a community asset with a
lifetime well beyond the 10-year time horizon of the OZ incentives. Given that an
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depreciate by the end of the 15-year compliance period because of the
additional 15 years of affordability and sales restrictions.135 This
neutralizes the OZ tax incentive of a basis step-up after holding the
property for ten years.136
LIHTC investors are primarily banks that invest in part to comply
with the CRA,137 whereas most OZ investors are high-net-worth
individuals looking to shelter capital gains with very different
expectations.138 For 2019, the average household income for OZ
investors exceeded $1 million — “approximately ten times higher
than the national average household income of $104,158.”139 “Typical
LIHTC investors such as banks often lack significant capital gains,”140
thus banks with qualified opportunity funds are unusual.141 The
Ogden Commons project benefitted from finding this mission-driven
investor for the commercial portion of the project but found no such
OZ investor for the residential portion of the project.

illiquid investment over a 10-year horizon is already challenging for OZ investors, the
type of investment many mission actors need and the OZ market’s investment
parameters are mismatched.” THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at
4.
135. See Graff, supra note 133, at 4.
136. See id. at 1, 3 (noting, however, that “Section 7701(g) can apply allowing the
investor to step up its Year 15 QOF basis to at least the amount of the nonrecourse
debt.” This step-up “should allow the OZLIHTC investor to avoid some or all of the
exit taxes that would otherwise be due”).
137. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-66, LOW-INCOME HOUSING
TAX CREDITS: AGENCIES IMPLEMENTED CHANGES ENACTED IN 2008, BUT PROJECT
DATA COLLECTION COULD BE IMPROVED 10 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao13-66.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK7M-LXS3]; see also OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDITS: AFFORDABLE HOUSING
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANKS (2014), https://www.occ.gov/publicationsand-resources/publications/community-affairs/community-developmentsinsights/pub-insights-mar-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/LS4U-YFTB].
138. The OZ tax incentive benefits wealthy individuals given that the top 1% of
households have 69% of all reported capital gains. See Capital Gains Go
Overwhelmingly to Wealthy Families, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
https://www.cbpp.org/capital-gains-go-overwhelmingly-to-wealthy-families
[https://perma.cc/KB8N-29Z5] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021); see also Kennedy &
Wheeler, supra note 10, at 19 (arguing that “the direct tax incidence of the OZ
program is likely to benefit households in the 99th percentile of the national
household income distribution”).
139. Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 19.
140. Graff, supra note 133, at 3.
141. “[A]pproximately 88% of the partners of higher-tier” qualified opportunity
fund partnerships were individuals. Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 19.
Furthermore, 82% of the OZ funds’ investment is concentrated in partnerships. See
id. at 10.
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III. COMPARISON OF THE LIHTC PROGRAM WITH THE
OPPORTUNITY ZONE TAX INCENTIVE
A. Similarities Between the LIHTC Program and the Opportunity
Zone Tax Incentive

There are several similarities between the LIHTC program and the
Opportunity Zone tax incentive.142 Both incorporate the concept of
public-private partnerships that is incentivizing private investors to
invest their capital respectively either in affordable rental housing or
“in high-impact projects in economically distressed communities.”143
In addition, both the LIHTC program and the Opportunity Zone tax
incentive have holding period requirements and require a certain
amount of technical expertise to implement.

1. Holding Period Requirements
To accomplish this goal of incentivizing private investors, both tax
incentive programs provide preferential tax treatment for the
investments if the investor holds the investment for a specified period.
The LIHTC program provides tax credits over a ten-year period for
investments held for at least 15 years.144 If an owner sells or transfers
title while the property is still within its 15-year initial compliance
period, this transfer generally requires the recapture of these tax
credits.145 “During such a recapture event, the owner loses any
projected future” LIHTCs from the property and must also repay
one-third of the LIHTCs previously claimed.146
The Opportunity Zone tax incentive provides for the deferral of an
initial capital gains tax as well as a varying level of capital gains tax
reductions dependent on holding the qualifying assets either five,

142. For a discussion of the New Markets Tax Credit and its differences with the
Opportunity Zone tax incentive, see Rebecca Lester, Cody Evans & Hanna Tian,
Opportunity Zones: An Analysis of the Policy’s Implications, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 221,
226–28
(2018),
http://opportunityzones.stanford.edu/docs/OpportunityZonesAnalysisofPolicyImplications.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GWB-RM5T]; see also Layser,
Nonprofit Participation, supra note 132 (manuscript at 4).
143. See Booker testimony, supra note 3, at 2.
144. See infra note 170 for description of the requirements.
145. COHNREZNICK LLP, HOUSING TAX CREDIT INVESTMENTS: INVESTMENT AND
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 36 (2018).
146. Id. (adding that “[a]dditional interest and penalties may apply, which may or
may not be covered by a recapture guarantee backstopped by the guarantors of the
transaction”).
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seven, or ten years.147 For example, if the qualifying investment is
held for at least five years, the taxpayer increases the basis by an
amount equaling 10% of the amount of gain deferred, in effect
getting to both defer and reduce the payment of taxes on the
taxpayer’s initial capital gains.148 Furthermore, if a taxpayer holds the
QOF investment for at least ten years, the taxpayer may increase the
basis to the fair market value at the date of sale, in effect deferring
payment of taxes on the initial capital gains and eliminating the taxes
on the appreciation of the QOF investment.149
Thus, the amount of the tax benefit is relatively fixed for the
LIHTC investor as the residual value is not an important
consideration for many corporate investors. The investor’s return is
expected to be primarily derived from the tax benefits. The investor
is “effectively purchasing a financial asset in the form of a stream of
tax benefits (consisting of tax credits and passive losses associated
with depreciation and mortgage interest deductions).”150 The OZ
investor’s tax benefit, however, depends on the holding period and
the future appreciation of the qualified assets.

2. Technical Expertise Requirements
The professionals involved in the Ogden Commons project talked
about the difficulties of putting together financing with either OZ
funds or LIHTCs.151 As is common with these mission-driven
projects, both sides of this project, the commercial building as well as
the residential phases, needed to stack multiple sources of debt and
equity in order to make the project work financially. LIHTCs have
been around since 1986, so there is a more mature market and easier
access to technical expertise. Technical advisors have noted that “the
Credit moves through allocation, delivery, and monetization via a
well-established, experienced, transparent, competitive, rapid-

147. Specifically, a taxpayer who realizes a gain from a sale of property and
reinvests that gain in a QOF within a designated time frame may defer recognition of
the gain. See I.R.C. §§ 1400Z-2(a)(1), (b)(1); see also I.R.S. Notice 2021-10,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-21-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5ZU-K3BY].
148. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the taxpayer holds the investment for at
least seven years, the taxpayer further increases the basis by an amount equaling 5%
of the amount of gain deferred. See id. § 1400Z-2(b)(2)(B)(iv). If the taxpayer holds
the investment for at least ten years, the taxpayer gets to both defer payment of taxes
on the taxpayer’s initial capital gains and to eliminate the capital gains taxes on the
QOF investment. See id. § 1400Z-2(c).
149. See id. § 1400Z-2I.
150. COHNREZNICK LLP, supra note 145, at 14.
151. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Jeff Head, supra note 129.
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feedback marketplace.”152 This, of course, has resulted from the
development of experienced stakeholders and infrastructure but still
requires legal and other advisors to implement and comply with all
the technical requirements.
Utilizing OZ funds also requires a certain level of technical
expertise, and there are particular difficulties in attracting most
private investment to below-market projects. Michael Snidal noted
that the public housing authorities appeared to be largely unfamiliar
with the OZ tax incentive when he presented his West Baltimore
study at the Council of Large Public Housing Authorities’ annual
meeting in the fall of 2019.153 Even with a foundation-funded OZ
Czar in Baltimore, “community stakeholders and small developers
fe[lt] there ha[d] been insufficient education and engagement at the
neighborhood level.”154 The West Baltimore study concluded that the
OZ tax incentive “is a sufficiently complicated economic
development tool that requires federal funding for education and
engagement.”155
Foundations, nonprofit organizations, and federal, state, and local
governments are closing the education gap. For example, in 2019, the
Rockefeller Foundation and Smart Growth America launched the
National Opportunity Zones Academy to assist selected cities to
attract socially responsible investment.156 These cities, which include
Chicago, receive access to technical assistance, “socially responsible
investors through curated introductory events,” and shared best
practices among the participating cities.157 Like other cities and
states, the City of Chicago has collected various resources and

152. RECAPITALIZATION ADVISORS, INC., THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY: A PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUES 4–5 (2002).
153. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 31.
154. Id. at 45. The Abell foundation funded the Baltimore City’s OZ coordinator
position. Id. at 16.
155. Id. at 24.
156. See Press Release, The Rockfeller Found., The Rockefeller Foundation and
Smart Growth America Launch National Opportunity Zones Academy (Sept. 17,
2019),
https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/news/rockefeller-foundation-smartgrowth-america-launch-national-opportunity-zones-academy/
[https://perma.cc/ERF8-TZST] (announcing the initial selection of five cities “to
participate in the Academy including Chicago, Greater Miami and the Beaches,
Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Norfolk, VA.”).
157. Id. (“SGA’s technical assistance team and its LOCUS program will work
directly with each participating city to create place-based, community-led approaches
to developing sustainable growth and development strategies that help transform
selected Opportunity Zones into economically-thriving and socially-inclusive,
walkable neighborhoods.”).
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interactable maps on its public website for developers and investors
to use to more easily navigate the Opportunity Zones and available
projects.158 In addition, the Chicago Community Loan Fund created
the Chicagoland Opportunity Zones Consortium to connect investors
and developers with projects and stakeholders in the Chicagoland
areas.159 The Urban Institute study observes that the OZ tax
incentive is stimulating “the evolution of a new community
development ecosystem, engaging both project developers and
investors who have limited historical engagement in community
development work.”160 Thus, the development of the needed
technical expertise and the maturation of the OZ marketplace is
happening.
B. Differences Between the LIHTC Program and the Opportunity
Zone Tax Incentive

There are, however, substantial differences between the LIHTC
program and the Opportunity Zone tax incentive. The main
difference is that the LIHTC requires the provision of a particular
good of value to the public (below-market housing), whereas the OZ
tax incentive does not have any such requirement. No local jobs need
to be created, no “community-based organizations or disadvantaged
businesses supported, or any needed community assets — like
affordable housing — constructed.”161 Furthermore, in contrast to
the very minimal requirements for self-certifying as a qualified
opportunity fund, there are very extensive requirements for obtaining
an allocation of LIHTCs.
Second, the federal cost of the LIHTC program is capped, whereas
the cost of the OZ tax incentive is only limited by the number of
qualified investors, those with capital gains willing to invest such in
qualified opportunity zone property.162 Unlike the LIHTC, there is

158. See
Opportunity
Zones,
CHI.
(May
11,
2018),
https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/EZ78-56HT].
159. See
Meet
the
Cities,
SMART
GROWTH
AM.,
https://smartgrowthamerica.org/program/national-opportunity-zones-academy/meetthe-cities/ [https://perma.cc/F3WZ-HQE7] (last visited June 18, 2021).
160. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4.
161. Brandon M. Weiss, Opportunity Zones, 1031 Exchanges, and Universal
Housing Vouchers, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
162. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-30, OPPORTUNITY ZONES:
IMPROVED OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO EVALUATE TAX EXPENDITURE PERFORMANCE 8–
9 (2020),
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no limit on “the total amount that can be deferred as a result of
investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds” or on “how much federal
revenue is reduced by” claiming the tax incentive.163
Finally, although in theory both the LIHTC and the OZ tax
incentive programs are nationally available, a study by two University
of California, Berkeley Economics graduate students, Patrick
Kennedy and Harrison Wheeler, demonstrates that the OZ
investment is highly spatially concentrated in approximately 30
states.164 LIHTC affordable housing projects, on the other hand, can
be found in every state.165

1. Administration of the LIHTC and OZ Programs
To qualify for the LIHTCs, a developer must submit a written
application to the state HFA designated by each state to allocate the
state’s authorized credit allocation.166 As previously described, this
state HFA must have adopted a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP) to
guide its approval process that sets forth the selection criteria, the
allocation process, and the compliance monitoring procedures.167
This QAP must include a 10% set aside for nonprofit developers.168
These plans are developed and revised through a “public process,

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-30.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2PS-HX8S] (noting that
the OZ tax incentive “has fewer limits on the types of projects that can be financed,
and fewer fiscal controls to limit potential revenue losses”).
163. Id. at 10.
164. See Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 1, 3 (noting in the author’s
footnote that the “research embodies work undertaken for the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation”).
165. See 2021 Federal LIHTC Information by State, NOVOGRADAC,
https://www.novoco.com/resource-centers/affordable-housing-tax-credits/2021federal-lihtc-information-state [https://perma.cc/DG7M-KA9H] (last visited Aug. 8,
2021) (indicating specific state-by-state allocation of credit).
166. As detailed in Section II.B, although projects financed with the private
activity tax-exempt bonds do not need a separate allocation for the 4% LIHTC, the
developer must have applied to the state housing financing agency for the bond
authority.
167. See KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 1 n.1, 4 (“Computed as the average
estimated tax expenditure associated with the program between FY2020 and FY2024.
This figure does not include revenue loss associated with the changes to the LIHTC
program enacted by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260. These
changes are estimated to reduce federal revenues by $6.7 billion between FY2021 and
FY2030.”). See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2020–2024 27 (Comm. Print
2020); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 116-68, THE
“CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2021” (Comm. Print 2020).
168. See I.R.C. § 42(h)(5).
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allowing for input from the general public and local communities, as
well as LIHTC stakeholders.”169
If the developer’s application for LIHTCs is approved through this
competitive process, the developer has demonstrated that its project
meets the state’s need for affordable housing as defined in the state’s
QAP. The state HFA then funds the qualified project and provides
the developer with the associated tax credits. The developer typically
sells the tax credits to private investors either directly or through a
syndicator to obtain the funding necessary for the project.170
In contrast, there is no requirement that the OZ investment benefit
the community or that the public be consulted with respect to the
project. As discussed previously, there are actual barriers to
involving nonprofits in Opportunity Zone transactions.171
Furthermore, administrative steps for qualification for qualified
opportunity funds are minimal. Qualified opportunity funds must
submit a Form 8996, Qualified Opportunity Fund, initially and
annually, to the IRS to self-certify that the corporation or partnership
is a QOF.172 The form requires minimal information such as the
name of the entity, identification number, census tracts, and the QOZ
property that is directly owned or leased by the taxpayer.173
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) treats investment
interests in QOFs as securities, so funds must also register with the
SEC unless they file for an exemption within 15 days of the first sale

169. KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 4.
170. Investors claim the LIHTC over a ten-year period once the housing is placed
in service. However, the LIHTC projects must comply with the income and rent
restrictions for 15 years otherwise the tax credits will be recaptured. I.R.C. §§
42(i)(1), (j). The statute also imposes an extended low-income housing commitment
of an additional 15 years that is subject to some exceptions. See id. § 42(h)(6); see
also Kaye, supra note 21, at 878–80.
171. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473–74. See generally Layser, Nonprofit
Participation, supra note 132.
172. See Form 8996: Qualified Opportunity Fund, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8996.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JVU-VR9Y] (last visited
Aug. 8, 2021) (“By checking this box, you certify that by the end of the taxpayer’s
first QOF year, the taxpayer’s organizing documents include a statement of the
entity’s purpose of investing in QOZ property and a description of the trade or
business(es) that the QOF is engaged in either directly or through a QOZ
business.”).
173. See id. The QOFs also use the form to report compliance with the 90% asset
test “or to calculate a penalty if it fails to meet that test.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-30, supra note 162, at 12.
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of securities in an offering.174 Investors in a QOF must file a Form
8997, Initial and Annual Statement of Qualified Opportunity Fund
(QOF) Investments, to report ongoing investments, new investments,
dispositions of Fund interests, and the corresponding gains
deferred.175

2. Federal Cost of the LIHTC and OZ Programs
Each state is granted an amount of LIHTCs pursuant to a federally
designated formula based on a state’s population and other factors.176
For 2021, this amount is the larger of approximately $3.2 million or
$2.81 per capita for each state.177 Funding for the LIHTC is capped
and is expected to result in revenue foregone of on average $10.9
billion annually.178 The Joint Committee on Taxation’s (JCT)
revenue estimates assume that the tax credit will be predominantly
used by corporations. “In most states, competition for LIHTC
resources is fierce”179 with a 3 to 1 ratio of submitted applications for
the 9% tax credits to the credits the state has available to distribute.180
Furthermore, any unused credit authority is placed in a national pool
to be reallocated among the qualified states.181 Because the LIHTC is
a scarce resource, only a limited number of applications will be
allocated credits.182

174. See THE COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE IMPACT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES:
AN INITIAL ASSESSMENT 15 (2020). QOFs seeking an exemption can file Form D and
provide information such as the amount sold in the offering. Id.
175. Form 8997, Initial and Annual Statement of Qualified Opportunity Fund
(QOF) Investments, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f8997.pdf [https://perma.cc/R89N-4UVQ] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).
176. See 2021 Federal LIHTC Information by State, supra note 165.
177. See Rev. Proc. 2020-45, 2020-27 I.R.B. 3. These numbers are adjusted for
inflation. “These figures reflect a temporary increase in the amount of credits each
state received as a result of the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141).
The increase is equal to 12.5% above what states would have received absent P.L.
115-141, and is in effect through 2021.” KEIGHTLEY, supra note 104, at 4.
178. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2020–2024 27 (Comm. Print 2020).
179. Kirk McClure et al., The LIHTC Program, Racially/Ethnically Concentrated
Areas of Poverty, and High-Opportunity Neighborhoods, 6 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 89,
110 (2020).
180. See COHNREZNICK LLP, supra note 145, at 10.
181. I.R.C. § 42(h)(3)(D); see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2020-42, 2020-41 I.R.B. 891
(showing the amount of unused housing credit carryovers allocated to 33 qualified
states for 2020 from the national pool of unused credit authority).
182. See generally CORIANNE PAYTON SCALLY, AMANDA GOLD & NICOLE
DUBOIS, URB. INST., THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: HOW IT WORKS AND
WHO
IT
SERVES
4
(2018),
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On the other hand, participation in the Opportunity Zones
program is only limited by the necessity of the relevant taxpayers
having capital gains that they are willing to reinvest in QOZ property.
The final OZ treasury regulations expanded these opportunities for
investors by not requiring the netting of gains from the sales of
certain business assets like real estate or machinery and equipment
with any losses from such assets.183 Samantha Jacoby of the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities noted that the JCT estimates in 2019
were “nearly double what it estimated in 2018 for this tax break.”184
Although the JCT estimates this tax incentive as costing on average
$1.6 billion per year,185 it is very difficult to estimate the future cost of
forgiving all capital gains tax on the unknown future appreciation of
the OZ investments.186 As discussed in the Introduction, investors
who hold their investments for ten years are eligible to exclude any
post-investment capital gains on their investment.187

3. Geographic Reach of the LIHTC and OZ Programs
Like the LIHTC program, the Opportunity Zone tax incentive is
nationally available, but it is geographically limited to the 8,764
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98758/lithc_how_it_works_and_
who_it_serves_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/987Y-63Y2].
183. See Investing in Qualified Opportunity Zones, 85 F.R. 1866, 1869 (Jan. 13,
2020) (providing “that eligible gains that may be deferred pursuant to section 1400Z2(a)(1)(A) and the section 1400Z-2 regulations include gains from the sale or
exchange of property described in section 1231(b) . . . (qualified section 1231 gains),
regardless of whether section 1231(a) . . . would determine those gains to be capital or
ordinary in character”).
184. Samantha Jacoby, Final Opportunity Zone Rules Could Raise Tax Break’s
Cost, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y. PRIORITIES (Feb. 3, 2020, 2:00 PM),
https://www.cbpp.org/blog/final-opportunity-zone-rules-could-raise-tax-breaks-cost
[https://perma.cc/VVY2-FTN2] (“The final regulations’ investor-friendly rule changes
create the potential for opportunity zones’ costs to go even higher than current
estimates — with no guarantee that low-income areas, or their residents, will
benefit.”); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FED. TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2019-2023 24 (Comm. Print 2019)
(estimating a cost of $13.7 billion for the years 2019–2022).
185. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 116TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2019–2023 30 (Comm. Print 2019).
186. See Lester et al., supra note 142, at 229 (noting that “[t]o the extent that there
is a large and enthusiastic response to this incentive by investors, the costs of the
forgone tax revenue because of reduced capital gains could be much higher”); see
also Samantha Jacoby, Potential Flaws of Opportunity Zones Loom, as Do Risks of
Large-Scale Tax Avoidance, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 11, 2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/potential-flaws-of-opportunity-zonesloom-as-do-risks-of-large-scale-tax [https://perma.cc/3VHR-XST3].
187. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2(c) (excluding all post-investment capital gains after ten
years).
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designated Opportunity Zones.188 Governors were able to designate
25% of their eligible tracts as Opportunity Zones.189 A census tract
not meeting the definition of a low-income community was still
eligible for OZ designation if the census tract bordered a designated
low-income Opportunity Zone and the median family income was not
in excess of 125% of that of the bordering, low-income community.190
Two hundred thirty of the designated OZ census tracts are such
contiguous tracts.191 Although the states selected the Opportunity
Zones, the federal nature of the tax incentive program “forces
distressed communities to compete for investment with nondistressed communities both locally and nationally.”192 As the West
Baltimore case study lamented, “if the playing field is West Baltimore
against gentrifying Brooklyn or [downtown] Portland, West
Baltimore isn’t happening.”193
In fact, evidence from the Kennedy-Wheeler study shows that most
qualified opportunity funds are being invested in just 16% of the
designated Opportunity Zones; 84% of the eligible census tracts
received no investment in 2019.194 Furthermore, most OZ investors
are making equity and property investments in those designated
census tracts “with relatively higher educational attainment, incomes,
home values,” and pre-existing income and population growth as well
as “declining shares of elderly and non-white residents.”195 This

188. BRETT THEODOS, BRADY MEIZELL & CARL HEDMAN, URB. INST., DID STATES
MAXIMIZE THEIR OPPORTUNITY ZONE SELECTIONS?: ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNITY
ZONE DESIGNATIONS 1 (2018) [hereinafter THEODOS ET AL., DID STATES
MAXIMIZE?],
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98445/did_states_maximize_their
_opportunity_zone_selections_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/6888-HZY7] (“April 20, 2018,
was the final deadline for governors (and the mayor of the District of Columbia) to
select which among the roughly 56 percent of eligible census tracts should be
classified as Opportunity Zones.”).
189. See id. (“[O]r at least 25 tracts in states with fewer than 100 qualified
tracts . . . .”).
190. See I.R.C. § 1400Z-1(e)(1).
191. See THEODOS ET AL., DID STATES MAXIMIZE?, supra note 188, at 1–2 (2.6% of
all designated tracts).
192. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 32–33.
193. Id. at 35 (quoting an interviewee who works in banking, fund management, or
business).
194. See Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 9–10 (observing $18.9 billion of
aggregate OZ investments from electronic filers of IRS Form 8996 in tax year 2019).
The preliminary data does not include paper filings, which account for an estimated
$6 billion or 25% of OZ investments. See id. at 3.
195. Id. at 3–4. But keep in mind that OZ census tracts “are socioeconomically
disadvantaged relative to eligible-but-not-chosen tracts . . . which are in turn
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preliminary data appears to echo Professor Michelle Layser’s study of
the New Market Tax Credit (NMTC) showing that, in many cases,
NMTC “subsidies have flowed disproportionately to eligible census
tracts that exhibit signs of gentrification.”196 Layser’s article predicted
that gentrifying OZ census tracts may similarly draw tax-subsidized
OZ investment away from other eligible Opportunity Zones.197 The
Kennedy-Wheeler study provides evidence to support that
prediction.198
LIHTC properties located in difficult development areas or
qualified census tracts are eligible to receive a “basis boost” as an
incentive for developers to invest in more distressed areas. In these
areas, the LIHTC can be claimed for 130% — instead of the normal
100% — of the project’s eligible basis.199 However, since 2008 the law
has provided for a discretionary basis boost such that state HFAs may
treat individual projects “as if” they were in difficult development
areas if needed for financial feasibility.200 Thus, state HFAs currently
have “the ability to designate any building, regardless of location, as
eligible for an enhanced credit” — up to 130% of the building’s
eligible basis.201 Professor Blaine Saito has expressed concern that
this bonus has “encourage[d] building in high poverty, high
segregation, low intergenerationally mobile, low amenity areas like
the qualified census tracts.”202 In fact, to address this issue, the Biden

disadvantaged relative” to all U.S. census tracts. See id. at 8 tbl. 1 (analyzing 74,001
census tracts).
196. Michelle D. Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification: A Spatial Analysis of PlaceBased Tax Incentives, 12 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 50)
[hereinafter Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification] (“reveal[ing] that, in most cities,
NMTC project density [wa]s highest in eligible census tracts that had high vacancy
rates, increasing rents, or both,” using high vacancy rates and increasing rents as
evidence of gentrification).
197. See id. (manuscript at 50). Layser explains that the results may even be worse
with respect to the OZ tax incentive program as it lacks any competitive allocation
process like the one used to administer the NMTC. Because the incentive is designed
as capital gains relief such that it is most valuable to taxpayers whose assets have
substantially appreciated, OZ investments are more likely to be profit-driven than
NMTC investment. Id. (manuscript at 59).
198. See Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 3.
199. See I.R.C. §§ 42(d)(5)(B)(i)–(iii).
200. See id. § 42(d)(5)(B)(v). This statute was amended by the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act. See Pub. L. 110-289, § 3003(a), 122 Stat. 2654, 2880 (2008).
201. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-66, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDITS: AGENCIES IMPLEMENTED CHANGES ENACTED IN 2008, BUT PROJECT DATA
COLLECTION COULD BE IMPROVED 9 tbl. 2 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-1366.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK7M-LXS3]; see also I.R.C. § 42(d)(5)(B)(v).
202. See Blaine G. Saito, Collaborative Governance and the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit, 39 VA. TAX REV. 451, 487 (2020).
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Administration has proposed providing for a 50% basis boost for
LIHTC developments in Census Tracts of Opportunity (CTO).203
CTOs are defined as “a tract which is entirely in one or more [difficult
development areas] or which has low poverty or other advantages.”204
IV. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY IMPACT

So, what has been the impact on the local community of the OZ
investment? With respect to the Ogden Commons project, new
construction jobs have been created and the developer has exceeded
Chicago’s minimums on local hiring preferences by utilizing more
than 26% of minority business enterprises and more than 6% of
women business enterprises.205 The tenants of the new commercial
building will create an estimated 150 jobs. The Mount Sinai Surgical
& Ambulatory Care Center will provide greater access to outpatient
surgical services and will expand their dialysis program as well as
attempt to remedy some of the health disparities that have been
highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic.206 The much-needed
restaurants are all minority-owned and managed and the Wintrust
Bank branch is also a valued resource for the community.207 Note
that 5.4% of U.S. residents, approximately 7.1 million households, do
not have a bank account.208
For this OZ tax incentive to actually help economically distressed
communities, there must be an intentional effort for the OZ
investment to reflect the needs of the residents within these
designated Opportunity Zones.209 As previously outlined, these OZ
tax incentives can be taken advantage of “without community input
or any process of prioritization where local governments can ensure
alignment with localized goals.”210 However, the residential phase of
the Ogden Commons project will likely be successful because of the
community benefit requirements of the LIHTC program including

203. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2022 REVENUE PROPOSALS 25 (2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/General-Explanations-FY2022.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4VLF-8MDB].
204. Id.
205. Telephone Interview with Jeff Head, supra note 129.
206. SHS Press Release, supra note 43.
207. See Serlin, supra note 68; Koziarz, supra note 69.
208. How America Banks: Household Use of Banking and Financial Services, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Oct. 19, 2020), https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/householdsurvey/index.html [https://perma.cc/8DNX-92GW].
209. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513.
210. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 2.
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the requirement of a qualified allocation plan that reflects the housing
needs of the relevant community. Furthermore, a typical 100-unit
LIHTC property, in its first year, on average, provides $7.9 million in
additional local income and supports 122 additional jobs.211
The commercial building of the Ogden Commons project is a
success because of the multiple requirements from the other sources
of funding that did necessitate community engagement.
The
partnership with a nonprofit hospital meant that the community’s
health needs had been assessed and that a plan to address those needs
had been developed with community stakeholders.212
The
partnership with the Chicago Housing Authority also necessitated the
involvement of residents and resident organizations in the planning,
development, and construction process, requiring “careful
consideration to residents’ suggestions.”213
In order to improve the respective neighborhoods, the OZ tax
incentive must incorporate some type of procedure for screening
projects and some type of approval process must be “required by an
administering agency with expertise in the development of lowincome communities.”214 As Professor Brandon Weiss has astutely
stated “merely parking capital near poverty will not solve deeply
entrenched social issues of poverty and racial inequity.”215 One such
proposal advocates “competitively award[ing] grants to certified
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) and
qualified nonprofit housing organizations that partner with qualified
opportunity funds to develop affordable housing.”216 The Treasury
Department’s CDFI Fund217 “would allocate these grants through a

211. See COHNREZNICK LLP, supra note 145, at 6 (noting that each year “the
housing tax credit program finances the construction or rehabilitation of
approximately 100,000 units of affordable housing that support roughly 96,000 jobs
and generate $3.5 billion in tax revenue”).
212. See supra note 71 (noting that the ACA of 2010 requires tax-exempt hospitals
to conduct a CHNA and CHIP every three years); see also SINAI 2019 CHNA, supra
note 42, at 18.
213. Redevelopment Contract, supra note 57, at 15.
214. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513.
215. Weiss, supra note 161 (“And it may in fact exacerbate the problem.”).
216. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513. Certified CDFIs are community lenders
that serve low-income communities and often provide funding for affordable housing
developments. See CDFI Certification: Your Gateway to the CDFI Community,
CMTY. DEV. FIN. INST. FUND, https://www.cdfifund.gov/sites/cdfi/files/documents/
cdfi_program_fact_sheet_certification_updatedjan2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9CPJKPL] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021).
217. “The CDFI Fund was created for the purpose of promoting economic
revitalization and community development through investment in and assistance to
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs).” About Us, CMTY. DEV.

1102

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

competitive application process to certified CDFIs or qualified
nonprofits with an affordable housing mission that are able to partner
with a QOF on an affordable housing project” or a mixed-use project
such as the Ogden Commons project.218 This program could be
structured very similarly to the CDFI Fund’s Capital Magnet Fund
that competitively “award[s] grants to finance affordable housing”
programs in low-income communities nationwide.219
Other scholars have also suggested involving CDFIs in the OZ tax
incentive.220 For example, an Urban Institute study recommended
redesigning the OZ incentive to “encourage equity investments in
CDFIs who set up QOFs.”221 In addition, Professor Layser has
identified several barriers that need to be overcome for nonprofits to
successfully participate in Opportunity Zone deals.222
Partnering a QOF with a certified CDFI or qualified nonprofit
would hopefully steer some of the estimated $75 billion of QOF
equity into sorely needed community development projects in truly
economically distressed Opportunity Zones in lieu of the luxury
housing and hotel projects that have tainted the Opportunity Zone
program’s reputation.223 Involving CDFIs or qualified nonprofits will
increase the likelihood that these expenditures will support activities
that are the most needed post-pandemic such as additional

FIN.
INST.
FUND,
https://www.cdfifund.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J8D5-HHGV].
218. Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513–14.
219. Capital
Magnet
Fund,
CMTY.
DEV.
FIN.
INST.
FUND,
https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Programs/cmf/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/FJ9K-JJUG] (last visited Sept. 21, 2021); see also Capital Magnet
Fund: Solutions for Affordable Housing in Low-Income Communities, CMTY. DEV.
FIN. INST. FUND (2020), [https://perma.cc/S8KP-VKPW].
220. CHARLES TANSEY & MICHAEL SWACK, UNIV. OF N.H., CARSEY SCH. OF PUB.
POL’Y, THE POTENTIAL ROLE FOR CDFIS IN OPPORTUNITY ZONES (2019),
https://scholars.unh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1362&context=carsey
[https://perma.cc/ZAL3-FQXH]; see also Layser et al., supra note 26, at 513–14
(outlining the role that CDFIs play with respect to the New Market Credits
program); Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 32 (noting that “[a]ll study
participants believed that CDFIs should be better integrated into and supported by
OZ”).
221. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 36.
222. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 473; see also Layser, Nonprofit
Participation, supra note 132 (manuscript at 35–36) (“identif[ying] several barriers,
including the requirement that Opportunity Funds make equity investment, the
absence of monetization structures, and uncertainty about how the investments will
be treated under the CRA”).
223. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, THE IMPACT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES: AN
INITIAL ASSESSMENT, 4 (2020) (estimating that qualified opportunity funds raised $75
billion in private capital by the end of 2019).
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interventions to increase the supply of affordable housing and to
address the challenges associated with vacant properties.224 To ensure
that the benefits of these interventions flow to neighborhood
residents and not just the investors, the OZ reforms should also limit
the subsidies to affordable housing development or economic
development that will directly benefit community residents.225
CONCLUSION

News articles have reported that the OZ tax incentive is driving
billions of investment profits into projects such as luxury apartments,
hotels, student housing, and storage facilities.226 Others criticize that
OZ funding is flowing into projects already underway227 or in
“neighborhoods that were already gentrifying.”228
The West

224. See Layser et al., supra note 26, at 467–68, 512.
225. Id. at 512–13. “[B]ecause opportunity zone investments are not required to
demonstrate specific benefits to the local population, investors may select projects
based solely on their financial return, with little local social impact.” Lester et al.,
supra note 142, at 229.
226. See, e.g., Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html
[https://perma.cc/ZH6K-RT5V] (noting that OZ investors minimize risk by investing
in high-end assets with little benefit going to the community); see also Mark A.
Pinsky & Keith Mestrich, Opinion, Opportunity Zones Are All Sizzle, Fizzle and the
Abuse of Good Intentions, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 22, 2019, 4:20 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/opportunity-zones-are-all-sizzle-fizzle-and-theabuse-of-good-intentions-2019-10-08 [https://perma.cc/4UYE-KY4P] (“The results to
date show that the outcomes are more likely to be luxury apartments and sparse jobs,
not affordable housing and employment opportunities.”); Justin Elliott, Jeff
Emthausen & Kyle Edwards, A Trump Tax Break to Help the Poor Went to a Rich
GOP Donor’s Superyacht Marina, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/superyacht-marina-west-palm-beach-opportunityzone-trump-tax-break-to-help-the-poor-went-to-a-rich-gop-donor
[https://perma.cc/ZQ5C-DCSV] (revealing how a major donor’s appeal to Florida
Governor Scott resulted in an OZ designation that included a marina owned by this
donor).
227. See Alex Nitkin, How a $2B Redevelopment Site in Chicago Landed in a
Federal Opportunity Zone: A TRD Investigation, REAL DEAL (May 1, 2019, 9:00
AM),
https://therealdeal.com/chicago/2019/05/01/how-a-2b-redevelopment-site-inchicago-landed-in-an-opportunity-zone-a-trd-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/VSC5X8J5]. The West Baltimore “study participants expect future investments to follow
the pattern of investments to date, supporting development that would have
happened without OZ.” Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 12.
228. Layser, Subsidizing Gentrification, supra note 196 (manuscript at 3 & n.6)
(“[G]entrifying census tracts had a 19 percent chance of receiving Opportunity Zone
designation.”); see also Kelsi M. Borland, Many Opportunity Zones Are Already
Gentrified,
GLOBEST
(Feb.
14,
2019,
4:00
AM),
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Baltimore study observed that 65% of all the OZ capital flowing into
Baltimore is concentrated “into one gentrified census tract, Port
Covington, where a $5.5 billion project was already underway.”229
The evidence is mixed in terms of the OZ tax incentive “making
projects work that would not otherwise happen” with some
developers reporting “a decisive difference in allowing a project to go
forward, while others were clear that their project would have
proceeded with or without OZ equity.”230 Other studies have found
that the lack of an upfront federal, state, or local government review
process is facilitating abuse of this tax expenditure.231
Although the program was intended to be national in scope, the
preliminary 2019 data confirm that distribution of the investment
capital has been driven by market forces to just 16% of the
designated Opportunity Zones, those that were already experiencing
gentrification at the expense of the other 84% of the OZs that
received no investment.232 Furthermore, most OZ investment is
concentrated in those tracts where population, educational
attainment, incomes, and home values are increasing while the
proportion of elderly and non-white residents is declining.233 Reforms
must be made to the OZ tax incentive to ensure that the types and
locations of the projects are consistent with the goal of improving
local economic conditions.
The U.S. Impact Investing Alliance and the Beeck Center for
Social Impact and Innovation at Georgetown University have set
forth guiding principles for Opportunity Zone investors in the hopes
of “ensur[ing] positive economic and social outcomes for all
Opportunity Zone communities.”234 The “Community Engagement”

https://www.globest.com/2019/02/14/many-opportunity-zones-are-already-gentrified/
[https://perma.cc/DYM7-D9E9].
229. Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 11.
230. THEODOS ET AL., EARLY ASSESSMENT, supra note 20, at 4–5.
231. See id. at 2 (noting “that incentives can be accessed without community input
or any process of prioritization where local governments can ensure alignment with
localized goals”); see also Snidal & Newman, supra note 64, at 3 (observing that
“[t]he policy’s flexible guidelines also raise concerns about whether and how the OZ
will spur capital investment in distressed neighborhoods”); Weiss, supra note 161
(comparing the OZ tax incentive to the Section 1031 real estate exchange gain
recognition deferral provision, “first and foremost, they are simply tax shelters”).
232. See Kennedy & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 3, 9 (observing $18.9 billion of
aggregate OZ investments from electronic filers of IRS Form 8996 in tax year 2019
that comprises 75% of the investment for that year).
233. See id. at 3–4.
234. THE WHITE HOUSE OPPORTUNITY & REVITALIZATION COUNCIL,
OPPORTUNITY ZONES BEST PRACTICES REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 8 (2020) (“This
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principle requires that Opportunity Fund “managers integrate the
needs of local communities into the formation and implementation of
the funds, reaching low-income and underinvested communities with
attention to diversity.”235 However, these principles are voluntary
and the structure of the OZ tax incentive encourages contrary results.
Given that the largest tax benefit comes from investing in property
that is most likely to garner future appreciation, OZ investment
gravitates toward commercial real estate investments in the least risky
neighborhoods. Those who take the least risk or get lucky are the
most rewarded.236 The possibility of community benefit must not be
left to chance. It must be an intentional part of the OZ tax incentive
tool, especially given the magnitude of the taxpayer revenue foregone
and the incidence of the tax benefit on the wealthy. It is not
appropriate for tax expenditures to be funding investments that do
not benefit the residents of those Opportunity Zones.
This Ogden Commons case study has demonstrated the benefit of
community engagement that came about because of the involvement
of a nonprofit organization and other mission-driven investors. It
does not appear that the OZ tax incentives are a strong enough
incentive alone for mission-driven projects. Social impact projects
like Ogden Commons require many layers of subsidy. This project
only worked due to the investment by anchor institutions such as
Mount Sinai Hospital, the City of Chicago, the Chicago Housing
Authority, and the state of Illinois as well as a CRA-motivated
investor such as PNC Bank. The OZ tax incentive was helpful with
respect to the commercial real estate phase of the Ogden Commons
project, financing over 50% of the commercial building. However,
OZ funding played no role in the affordable housing phases of the
project. Instead, the developers are relying on tax-exempt financing,

framework has been voluntarily adopted by various Qualified Opportunity Funds.”);
see also Inclusive Community Impact Investing, BEECK CTR. FOR SOC. IMPACT &
INNOVATION, https://beeckcenter.georgetown.edu/project/inclusive-impact-investingopportunity-zones/ [https://perma.cc/H3MH-K74A] (last visited Sept. 22, 2021).
235. U.S. IMPACT INVESTING ALL. ET AL., Prioritizing and Achieving Impact in
Opportunity
Zones
2,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
5c5484d70b77bd4a9a0e8c34/t/5d1144358bc6b10001a5af3f/1561412661497/Opportunit
y+Zones+Reporting+Framework+-+June+2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHC6-SZ4S].
236. Layser, Nonprofit Participation, supra note 132 (manuscript at 27) (“[I]t is
worth noting that a successful project that generates post-investment gains,
compounded over ten years, could provide taxpayers with tax-free returns that
eclipse the tax savings associated with the initial deferral. Taxpayers who anticipate
significant profits from an investment may find this third benefit particularly
attractive . . . . As a result, the Opportunity Zones law provides the strongest
incentive package to taxpayers who plan to pursue highly profitable projects.”).

1106

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

4% as well as 9% LIHTCs, and other Illinois-specific grants and tax
incentives.
This Article also advocates for the involvement of CDFIs in this
place-based tool to help distressed communities. The Ogden
Commons case study and Professor Layser’s Essay have respectively
demonstrated the benefits and the necessity of involving nonprofit
organizations.
The entire Opportunity Zone tool must be
reexamined to determine precisely what result is intended with this
major investment of taxpayer dollars. Reforms to the structural
design of the OZ tool are necessary to ensure that this investment
pays off.

